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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
        FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                 
 
No. 93-5080 
                 
 
NANCY SIMMERMAN, each individually, dba CHILD 
CARE CENTER, dba SERENDIPITY PRE-SCHOOL, dba 
WEE CARE CENTER; HERBERT SIMMERMAN, each  
individually, dba CHILD CARE CENTER, dba 
SERENDIPITY PRE-SCHOOL, dba WEE CARE CENTER; 
PAUL SIMMERMAN, each individually, dba CHILD CARE 
CENTER, dba SERENDIPITY PRE-SCHOOL, dba WEE CARE CENTER 
 
       
          v. 
 
JOHN CORINO, Cape May County Prosecutor; ROBERT G. 
WELLS, First Assistant Prosecutor of Cape May County; 
ANTONIA COWAN, Assistant Prosecutor of Cape May County; 
MARIE HAYES, Investigator for Cape May County Prosecutor; 
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF CAPE MAY COUNTY; BETTY VEACH, 
each individually and as parents and natural guardians for 
CHRISTOPHER SAMUEL VEACH, a minor; SAMUEL VEACH, each 
individually and as parents and natural guardians for  
CHRISTOPHER SAMUEL VEACH, a minor; CHRISTOPHER SAMUEL VEACH, 
a minor; VERONICA LEIDER, each individually and as parents 
and natural guardians of RONALD J. "RONNIE" LEIDER, a minor; 
RONALD LEIDER, each individually and as parents and natural 
guardians of RONALD J. "RONNIE" LEIDER, a minor; RONALD 
J. "RONNIE" LEIDER, a minor; DICK CRANE, Bureau of  
Licensing of the Division of Youth and Family Services;  
SUSAN MANION, Institutional Abuse Unit Administrator; 
DYFS BUREAU LICENSING; DYFS INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 
INVESTIGATION UNIT; DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
(DYFS); DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; THOMAS FLANAGAN, 
Investigator for State Department of Criminal Justice; 
EUGENE PETRELLA, STATE TROOPER; DAVID KENNA, DETECTIVE; 
JUSTIN J. DINTINO, COLONEL, New Jersey State Police, 
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE; ANNE BURGESS, DR.; PAMELA KANE; 
MARTIN FINKEL, DR.; RICHARD ROES, NOS. 1 through 25;  
STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
 
  Mark S. Guralnick, Esq., and 
  Law Offices of Mark S. Guralnick, 
 
      Appellants 
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Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
D.C. Civil Docket No. 92-00194 
 
                                  
 
 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 17, 1993 
 
Before:  GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
and FULLAM, District Judge0 
                       
 
(Opinion filed:  June 21, 1994) 
 
James S. Webb, Jr., Esquire 
5102 New Jersey Avenue 
P.O. Box 530 
Wildwood, NJ 08260 
     Attorney for Cape May County Appellees  
 
Robert J. Del Tufo 
Attorney General of New Jersey 
Mary C. Jacobson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Joseph L. Yannotti 
Assistant Attorney General 
John M. Fahy 
Don E. Catinello 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 
Department of Law & Public Safety 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
     Attorneys for the State of New Jersey Appellees 
 
Daniel H. Greenberg, Esquire 
501 Madison Avenue, Room 406 
New York, NY 10022 
      Attorney for Appellee Burgess 
 
Mark S. Guralnick, Esquire 
Garber & Guralnick 
1288 State Highway 73, Suite 120 
Mount Laurel, NJ 08054 
      Attorney for Appellants 
                     
0Honorable John P. Fullam, United States District Court Judge for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 The plaintiffs' attorney, Mark S. Guralnick, appeals 
the district court's imposition of sanctions in the amount of 
$7,000 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.0  Several months after the 
district court disposed of the underlying action through a grant 
of summary judgment on some claims and the dismissal of others, 
it imposed sanctions on its own initiative.  The court based its 
order upon a finding that the fatal deficiencies of the 
plaintiffs' claims "should have [been] revealed to Mr. Guralnick" 
in the course of a "reasonable investigation" of the law and the 
facts of the case.  Simmerman v. Corino, No. 92-194, slip op. at 
8 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 1993)(order and opinion denying motion for 
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and imposing sanctions 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at 
129, 136.   
 Although Mr. Guralnick appeals on a number of grounds, 
we do not find it necessary either to address the culpability of 
his conduct, or to determine whether the district court abused 
its discretion in determining that sanctions were warranted. 
Rather, we find that the order imposing sanctions must be vacated 
because the court's actions were inconsistent with the 
                     
0We note that Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 was amended on December 1, 1993, 
during the pendency of this appeal.  Our decision is based upon 
the rule as it existed prior to that amendment. 
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supervisory rule adopted by this court in Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. 
v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1988).  In that case, motivated 
by a concern that Rule 11 motions be filed and decided in a 
timely manner, we adopted a requirement that "all motions 
requesting Rule 11 sanctions be filed in the district court 
before the entry of a final judgment."  Id. at 100.  Though 
Pensiero dealt with the timing of a motion filed by a party, we 
find that the rule is equally applicable where the trial court 
properly invokes its authority to initiate the imposition of 
sanctions.  When the trial court believes that sanctions are 
warranted, then, it should decide the issue prior to or 
concurrent with its disposition of the case on the merits.  
Although sanctions may have been warranted in this case, their 
imposition more than three months after the entry of final 
judgment was untimely. 
 Furthermore, we note that, even had the award of 
sanctions been timely, the district court's failure to comport 
with the requirements of procedural due process -- that is, 
notification that sanctions were under consideration and the 
provision of some opportunity to respond prior to their 
imposition -- would similarly require a reversal and remand in 
this case.   
I. 
A. 
 The underlying action was a civil case brought by the 
plaintiffs after they were acquitted of criminal charges 
involving the alleged sexual abuse of children.  Plaintiffs 
5 
Nancy, Herbert and Paul Simmerman previously operated the Wee 
Care Day Care Center in Cape May, New Jersey.  In late 1989, 
after reports by several children, the plaintiffs were 
investigated and eventually indicted on child abuse charges. They 
were acquitted after a full trial; in turn, they filed this civil 
suit against many of the private individuals, officials, and 
public entities involved in the prosecution of their case. Mr. 
Guralnick served as their attorney in this civil matter. 
 The complaint filed by Mr. Guralnick asserted claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (RICO), as 
well as various pendent state law claims.  As relevant to the 
matter before us, the complaint named as defendants the State of 
New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Human Services, the New 
Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services Bureau of Licensing 
and Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit, the New Jersey 
Division of State Police, the directors and administrators of 
several of these agencies, a medical doctor, a police 
investigator, a state trooper, and a state police detective. 
These will be referred to collectively as the State defendants. 
In addition, the plaintiffs sued the Cape May County Prosecutor's 
Office and several of its employees, two psychiatric experts, and 
the parents of two of the children who testified during the 
criminal trial.    
 In essence, the complaint sought damages for alleged 
wrongful treatment of the plaintiffs during their criminal 
prosecution.  The full complaint is reprinted in the Appellant's 
6 
Appendix at 1-77.  A sampling of its seventeen counts reads as 
follows: the complaint charged the existence of a "scheme" to 
"set-up" and "frame" the plaintiffs (App. at 27-28); it claimed 
that because of the "concerted unlawful and malicious detention, 
. . . indictment, . . . public prosecutions of the Plaintiffs, 
[and] sham proceedings," plaintiffs were deprived of their 
liberty without due process of law and deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws (App. at 18); it alleged that the expert 
witnesses committed fraud in their testimony (Appellant's App. at 
65-66); it sought relief for "gross and willful oppression and . 
. . willful abuse of process" by the parents who reported the 
alleged abuse and caused criminal complaints to be filed against 
the plaintiffs (App. at 49-50, 62); and it charged the defendants 
with the intentional infliction of emotional distress (App. at 
63). 
 The State defendants responded by filing a motion for 
dismissal and/or summary judgment, and each of the remaining 
defendants followed with similar motions.  After hearing argument 
on the motions, the court on October 23, 1992 granted summary 
judgment to all defendants on the § 1983 claims, dismissed the 
RICO claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the remaining state law claims.  Simmerman v. Corino, 804 F. 
Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1992).  On appeal, the district court's order 
was affirmed without opinion by this court.  Simmerman v. Corino, 
16 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 1993). 
B.   
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 The present appeal arises from the district court's 
actions in sua sponte imposing sanctions on Mr. Guralnick on 
January 25, 1993, more than three months after the court had 
disposed of the underlying case.  Although another, individual 
defendant had previously sought and been awarded sanctions 
against Mr. Guralnick,0 the January 25 sanctions were imposed on 
the court's own initiative and awarded to the State defendants. 
 At the time that the court decided to sanction Mr. 
Guralnick, it had before it an application by the State 
defendants for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988.0  That application had been filed on December 9, 1992, 
six weeks after the case had been dismissed, and it requested 
fees and costs of more than $22,000. 
                     
0Defendant Dr. Anne Burgess filed a motion for fees and Rule 11 
sanctions on August 14, 1992, two months prior to the court's 
dispositive ruling.  On November 13, 1992, the district court 
granted the motion for sanctions, finding that the complaint was 
devoid of support in both law and fact.  Simmerman v. Corino, No. 
92-194, slip op. at 8 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 1992)(order and opinion 
granting motion for Rule 11 sanctions); App. at 126.  The court 
ordered that Mr. Guralnick be liable for Dr. Burgess' costs and 
attorney's fees, and it requested that Dr. Burgess' counsel 
submit an affidavit on the amounts incurred in defending the 
case.  Before that was done, and before the court could set a 
fixed amount under the sanctions order, Mr. Guralnick brought an 
appeal before this court.  That appeal, No. 92-5704, was 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the district court's 
order was not yet final.  
0In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides: 
 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . of 
this title, . . . the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . 
. . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs.   
8 
 The court found that the defendants were eligible for 
an award under § 1988; however, emphasizing the discretionary 
language of the statute, it declined the award and chose to 
impose Rule 11 sanctions instead.  Citing our decision in Brown 
v. Borough of Chambersberg, 903 F.2d 274, 276-77 (3d Cir. 1990), 
the court explained its concern that an award under § 1988 could 
only be authorized against the plaintiffs themselves, rather than 
against plaintiffs' attorney.  The court found it significant 
that the plaintiffs should not necessarily have known that their 
action was deficient, but rather that "it was the responsibility 
of plaintiffs' attorney to determine whether any of those alleged 
wrongs were actionable under § 1983" and to so advise his 
clients.  Simmerman v. Corino, No. 92-194, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 25, 1993)(order and opinion denying motion for attorney's 
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and imposing sanctions pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); App. at 133.  Finding Mr. Guralnick, rather 
than his clients, to be at fault in the filing of this 
action,0the court reasoned that it was inappropriate to hold 
plaintiffs responsible for the reimbursement to which the State 
defendants were entitled.  As such, the court denied fees under § 
1988 and turned to Rule 11 as an "alternative theor[y] of 
liability for attorney's fees and costs.  Simmerman v. Corino, 
No. 92-194, slip op. at 7 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 1993)(order and 
opinion denying motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
                     
0For example, the court explained that the § 1983 claims were 
disposed of on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment and absolute and 
qualified immunity doctrines -- legal theories that would not be 
known to an ordinary non-attorney plaintiff.     
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and imposing sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); App. at 
135.      
 Without notice to Mr. Guralnick that sanctions were 
under consideration, and without providing him the opportunity to 
explain his actions in preparing and filing the case, the court 
then imposed sanctions.  Finding the § 1983 claims to be 
unsupported by factual allegations and concluding that "a 
reasonable investigation into the law of § 1983 would have 
revealed to Mr. Guralnick that plaintiffs' claims were 
untenable," the court found that counsel's pleadings violated the 
requirements of Rule 11.  The court settled upon $7,000 as an 
appropriate sanction and ordered that amount paid to the State 
defendants.   
II. 
 Because Mr. Guralnick appeals from a final order of the 
district court, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  On review, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to 
all aspects of the district court's Rule 11 determination. Cooter 
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990); CTC 
Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 577 
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom., Aham-Neze v. Sohio Supply 
Co., 112 S.Ct. 1950 (1992); Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real 
Estate, 951 F.2d 1399, 1413 (3d Cir. 1991).  That is, we evaluate 
the court's factual determinations, legal conclusions, and choice 
of an "appropriate sanction" with substantial deference, 
considering not whether we would make the same precise 
determinations, but only whether those determinations are 
10 
contrary to reason or without a reasonable basis in law and fact. 
For example, a district court would abuse its discretion if it 
"based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 
erroneous assessment of the evidence."  Cooter & Gell, 110 S.Ct. 
at 2461.     
III. 
A. 
 Rule 11 imposes three specific duties upon attorneys 
practicing before the federal courts.  It provides in part: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a 
party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record . . 
. . The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by the signer that 
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or 
other paper; that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief formed by 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law[;] 
and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. . . . If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction . . . . 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.  The rule thus provides that an attorney who 
fails to either 1) read the pleading; 2) make a reasonable 
inquiry into the factual and legal legitimacy of the pleading; or 
3) file the pleading only for a proper purpose, shall be 
sanctioned.  The standard for testing an attorney's conduct is 
that of what was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 
11 
Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  To comply with this standard, counsel "must conduct 
'a reasonable investigation of the facts and a normally competent 
level of legal research to support the presentation.'"  Pensiero, 
847 F.2d at 94 (citing Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 157 
(3d Cir. 1986)). 
 We have emphasized that Rule 11 targets abuse, making 
sanctions appropriate only if "the filing of the complaint 
constituted abusive litigation or misuse of the court's process." 
Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 
66, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Herman Bros., Inc. v. 
Teamsters Local Union No. 430, 109 S.Ct. 128 (1988).  Thus, the 
mere failure of a complaint to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment or a motion to dismiss should not be thought to 
establish a rule violation.  However, once that standard has been 
met, the language of the rule "seeks to dispel apprehensions that 
efforts to obtain enforcement will be fruitless by insuring that 
the rule will be applied . . . ."  Notes of Advisory Committee on 
Rules, 1983 Amendment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.   See also Cooter & 
Gell, 110 S.Ct. at 2454. 
B. 
 Although the court has both the authority and the duty 
to assure compliance with the requirements of the rule,0 we find 
                     
0"Authority [for courts to impose sanctions on their own motion] 
has been made explicit in order to overcome the traditional 
reluctance of courts to intervene unless requested by one of the 
parties.  The detection and punishment of a violation of the 
signing requirement . . . is part of the court's responsibility 
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that the court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions on its 
own initiative more than three months after it had disposed of 
the underlying case.  In Pensiero, we adopted a supervisory rule 
to guide the courts and the parties on the appropriate timing for 
the filing and consideration of Rule 11 motions.  In that case, a 
motion for sanctions was filed by a defendant who prevailed in a 
motion for summary judgment.  However, the motion was filed only 
after the appeal on the merits had been docketed and an 
affirmance order received from this court.  The district court 
granted sanctions against the defendants and this court reversed 
on the ground that there was no rule violation because there was 
adequate compliance with the pre-filing inquiry requirement.  In 
addition, however, we adopted a supervisory rule aimed at 
eliminating piecemeal review:  we held that "counsel seeking Rule 
11 sanctions must file their motions before entry of final 
judgment in district court."  Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 92.  See also 
Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate, 951 F.2d 1399, 1413 
(3d Cir. 1991)(request for sanctions after entry of final 
judgment untimely); Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int'l., 899 F.2d 250, 251 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1990)(same).    
 The logic of Pensiero applies equally to sua sponte 
consideration of sanctions by the district court.  There we 
emphasized the undesirability of separate appeals concerning 
merits and fee questions and noted that,  
[i]n general, the dictates of due process 
should not necessitate prolonged 
                                                                  
for securing the system's effective operation." Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Rules, 1983 Amendment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.   
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consideration in the district court to assess 
Rule 11 sanctions once a violation has been 
established. 
Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 99.  There is no inordinate burden in 
requiring the district court to raise and resolve any Rule 11 
issues prior to or concurrent with its resolution of the merits 
of the case.  Such timing will, furthermore,  
conserve judicial energies.  In the district 
court, resolution of the issue before the 
inevitable delay of the appellate process 
will be more efficient because of current 
familiarity with the matter.  Similarly, 
concurrent consideration of challenges to the 
merits and the imposition of sanctions avoids 
the invariable demand on two separate 
appellate panels to acquaint themselves with 
the underlying facts and the parties' 
respective legal positions. 
Id.         
 In the context of a possible Rule 11 violation, the 
court and opposing party are in similar positions.  Both know of 
the rule and its requirements, and both possess similar 
information about the conduct and the pleadings of counsel.  The 
Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the rule explain that 
notice should be given promptly upon the discovery of a rule 
violation.  There is no reason why prompt action should be 
required of an opposing party and yet not similarly required of 
the court.  At the time that the court decided the motions for 
summary judgment and dismissal, it had before it the identical 
information that it relied upon three months later in imposing 
the sanctions.  Nothing was to be gained by delay.  If sanctions 
had truly been appropriate, the court should have imposed them at 
14 
that time.0  Their imposition three months later was an abuse of 
discretion. 
C. 
 While the Pensiero violation is sufficient to require 
reversal in this case, we find it necessary to comment briefly 
upon another, equally sufficient error.  That is the failure of 
the district court to comply with the requirements of procedural 
due process in the course of imposing the sanctions. 
 Sanctions are not to be assessed without full and fair 
consideration by the court.  They often entail a fine which may 
have more than a token effect upon an attorney's resources.  More 
                     
0We note that the precise timing of the sanctions in this case 
further supports the rationale of Pensiero and casts doubt on the 
sanctions' underlying validity.  As established, the court had 
the authority to initiate the imposition of sanctions at the time 
of summary judgment and dismissal, if it believed that a rule 
violation had occurred.  In fact, because the disposition on the 
merits and the decision on sanctions were based on the same, 
underlying absence of factual and legal support in the complaint, 
such would have been the logical time to do so.  Yet the court 
did not do so. 
 Rather, the court used Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device 
only after finding, on motion by a party, that the State 
defendants were entitled to recover fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§1988.  Apparently it was because the court did not want the 
plaintiffs to be personally liable for those fees that it 
addressed the issue of the Rule 11 liability of counsel.   
 Interestingly, the State defendants did not themselves 
request sanctions, though it is a common practice to make such a 
request when moving for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Most likely 
this was because they filed six weeks after the entry of final 
judgment and because they knew of the rule of Pensiero. Certainly 
the court was aware of Pensiero:  before it granted Dr. Burgess' 
motion for sanctions, it acknowledged that she properly complied 
with Pensiero by filing her motion two months before the case was 
dismissed.  Where the court has not, of its own initiative, 
imposed sanctions when they were properly due, it would be an odd 
result indeed to permit the court to later accomplish that which 
a party, because of improper delay, could not request.      
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importantly, they act as a symbolic statement about the quality 
and integrity of an attorney's work -- a statement which may have 
tangible effect upon the attorney's career.  Thus the Supreme 
Court, in recognizing the inherent power of a court over the 
members of its bar, acknowledged that the limits of procedural 
due process circumscribe the manner in which otherwise proper 
sanctions may be imposed.  It held that sanctions "should not be 
assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing on the record." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 100 S.Ct. 
2455, 2464 (1980).  Likewise, this court repeatedly has held in 
both inherent power and Rule 11 sanctions cases that, 
[i]n the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances, procedural due process 
requires notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before any governmental deprivation of 
a property interest. 
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570 (3d Cir. 
1985)(in banc).  See also Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 
F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990)("Prior to sanctioning an attorney, 
a court must provide the party to be sanctioned with notice of 
and some opportunity to respond to the charges."); Notes of 
Advisory Committee on Rules, 1983 Amendment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 
("The procedure obviously must comport with due process 
requirements."). 
 The precise form of procedural protection required 
will, of course, vary with the circumstances of the case.  With 
regard to the notice component, however, we have held that the 
mere existence of the rule does not satisfy the requirement. 
Jones, 899 F.2d at 1357; Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 
16 
82-83 (3d Cir. 1987).  The party sought to be sanctioned is 
entitled to particularized notice including, at a minimum, 1) the 
fact that Rule 11 sanctions are under consideration, 2) the 
reasons why sanctions are under consideration, and 3) the form of 
sanctions under consideration.  Id.  Only with this information 
can a party respond to the court's concerns in an intelligent 
manner.  Similarly, the precise form of counsel's opportunity to 
respond will vary with the circumstances and is a decision 
committed to the discretion of the court.  There may be times 
when an oral or evidentiary hearing will be necessary to aid in 
the court's factfinding.  At other times the opportunity for 
counsel to fully brief the issue will suffice.   
 At bottom, however, there must be notice and some 
opportunity to respond.  Here, there was neither.  In Eash, we 
explained the salutary effects of these procedural protections. 
757 F.2d at 571.  They assist the attorney by ensuring an 
adequate and meaningful opportunity to explain the conduct at 
issue.  They assist the court by ensuring adequate time for full 
consideration of the issue in light of the attorney's 
explanation.  Finally, they provide a record that facilitates 
review on appeal.  This case merely proves the rule that these 
procedural protections may have substantive effect upon outcome. 
Had Mr. Guralnick been able to respond, whether orally or in 
writing, the court would not have been forced to base its 
17 
decision on assumptions about the parties' actions and state of 
knowledge.0   
 Perhaps most importantly, sua sponte imposition of 
sanctions cannot serve the intent of Rule 11.  The purpose of the 
rule is to foster accountability and to deter abuse.  Pensiero, 
847 F.2d at 94-95.  Yet, "[i]f Rule 11 is effectively to deter 
abuses in federal civil litigation and not to deter much else in 
addition, it seems to us that both those who are sanctioned 
(specific deterrence) and others (general deterrence) must 
understand what the abuses were and have some sense of how to 
correct them in the future."  American Judicature Society, Rule 
11 in Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on 
Federal Rule of Procedure 11 29 (Stephen B. Burbank, rep. 1989). 
The dialogue that is permitted by notice and an opportunity to 
respond can only facilitate such understanding.   
IV. 
 Having concluded that the imposition of sanctions in 
this case was contrary to the supervisory rule adopted by this 
court in Pensiero, as well as the requirements of the Due Process 
                     
0For example, the court based its conclusion that plaintiffs bore 
no fault in the filing of the lawsuit upon its observation that 
"It does not appear to the court that plaintiff[s] should have 
known their action against the State defendants was legally 
deficient."  Simmerman v. Corino, No. 92-194, slip op. at 5 
(D.N.J. Jan. 25, 1993)(order and opinion denying motion for 
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and imposing sanctions 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); App. at 133.  Surely some 
inquiry beyond the face of the complaint -- inquiry into the 
actual state of plaintiff's knowledge -- would have assisted the 
court by allowing it to base its conclusions on fact rather than 
assumption.    
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment, we will reverse the order of the 
district court and vacate the award of sanctions to the State  
defendants. 
19 
   
FULLAM, J., Concurring  
 
 Because the practice of issuing prospective rulings in  
 
the purported exercise of "supervisory power" is firmly  
 
entrenched, I agree that this court's decision in Mary Ann  
 
Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90 (3rd Cir. l988), compels  
 
reversal of the sanction order involved in this appeal.  I do not  
agree, however, that Pensiero does more than require that motions  
for sanctions be filed before final judgment; the Pensiero court  
 
did not purport to 'supervise' the timing of the district court's  
ruling on such motions, except perhaps to the extent of urging  
 
that the ruling be made with sufficient speed to enable  
 
consolidation of the sanction appeal with the appeal on the  
 
merits.  In the present case, there was no motion for sanctions;  
 
and the issue was first raised some three months after judgment.  
Under any view of the matter, I agree that this was too late.   
 
 I join in Part III(C) of the majority opinion. 
 
